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Gendered brokerage and firm performance - an interlock analysis of the UK 
Abstract
Purpose: Corporate success depends partially on the quality of knowledge accessible to the 
executive board.  One route of access to such knowledge is the appointment of directors who 
already hold directorships with prominent other corporate actors. Such director appointments 
provide interlocks to a corporate knowledge ecosystem (Haunschild and Beckman, 1998). The 
purpose of this paper is to examine how linkages between companies belonging to different sectors 
impact firm performance and to examine how linkages created by female directors, as opposed to 
male directors, shape performance. 
Design/methodology/approach: This paper investigates the interlocks created between UK FTSE 
350 companies from 2010 to 2018. It draws on network analysis to map the roles that male and 
female directors play in linking firms with varying sector classifications. The paper provides an 
examination of the impact of these roles on firm performance, through a panel data regression 
analysis. 
Findings: This paper finds that there is an increase of inter-industry brokers over the period, and 
that men are still dominant in both the network and creating inter-industry ties amongst companies. 
However, the role of women in establishing these ties appears to be changing, and women are more 
important when it comes to create inter-industry ties among key economic sectors. 
Originality: This paper provides a novel approach to examine the interplay between gendered inter 
(and intra) sectoral linkages and firm performance. It provides an original application of the two-
mode brokerage analysis framework proposed in Jasny and Lubell (2015).
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1. Introduction
Interlocking directorates happen when a director who is affiliated with one company also sits on 
the board of directors of another.  This is a multilevel decision involving the director who is taking 
a new appointment, the appointing company board, as well as all other corporations he/she is 
affiliated with. Over the years, interlocks are no longer seen as a controlling mechanism but as a 
knowledge transfer mechanism. This has been associated to resource dependency theory (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978), where interlocks can be seen as a source of information, reducing uncertainty 
for companies. 
We construct this work on the assumption that interlocks indeed act as transfer mechanisms 
between companies. We investigate the gender composition of the boards when interlocks can 
facilitate a knowledge transfer mechanism between companies belonging to various sectors. The 
study is done on UK FTSE 350 companies, and we look at their boards of directors from 2010 to 
2018. The year 2010 marks an important milestone for efforts to achieve gender equality on 
executive boards. Following the Cadbury Report of 1992 (Cadbury, 1992), the Higgs Review 
(Higgs, 2003), and the Tyson Report (Tyson, 2003), highlighting underrepresentation of women in 
executive boards in the UK and the important contributions by women to boards, the 30% Club 
was established in August 2010. The 30% Club is a self-organised group campaigning for an 
increase in representation of women on public company boards in the UK. Since gender on the 
executive board is a topic of interest for this study, our data goes back to 2010, and the study 
focuses on the period after this intervention, the establishment of the 30% club.  


































































To achieve the objectives of this study, we make use of Network Analysis concepts. Interlocks can 
be considered as evidence of inter-organisational network ties, and hence we can construct 
networks of directors and companies, namely interlocking directorate networks (Heemskerk et al., 
2016). Within these networks, we analyse the concept of brokerage. Brokerage is defined as “a 
relation in which one actor mediates the flow of resources or information between two other actors 
who are not directly linked” (Fernandez and Gould, 1994, p. 1457). Hence, we use brokerage as a 
means of understanding the potential of a transfer mechanism of these interlocking directorate 
networks between 2010 and 2018.  
This paper is structured as follows: the next section provides an overview of the literature on 
interlocking directorates, focusing on interlocks as a transfer mechanism, the intersection of gender 
diversity and interlocking directorates, and the use of legislation to promote gender equality on 
corporate boards. This section concludes with a presentation of the hypotheses that this paper seeks 
to address. This is followed by a data and methods section, noting the data sources and 
methodology (including the model specification). A results section follows, detailing the modelling 
results. In addition, there is a section where we discuss making use of an alternative measure of 
performance, to act as a robustness check. The final section provides a conclusion, an overview of 
the main results and limitations, along with avenues for future research.
2. Literature review & hypotheses
Network research initially focused on examining how individuals’ embeddedness can have an 
impact on their behaviour (Granovetter, 1985). Later on, this notion was extended to organisations, 
for example in the works of Burt (1982), Mizruchi (1992), and Gulati (1995). There are various 
social and economic relationships by which companies can be interconnected and perceived in 
network terms, and interlocking directorates is one example of such relationships.


































































2.1.  Interlocks as a transfer mechanism 
The research on interlocking directorates suggest different paradigms as explanations for why 
interlocks are created (Smith and Sarabi, 2021a). Over the years, the idea of interlocks as a 
controlling mechanism has changed into interlocks as a transfer mechanism.  Numerous theoretical 
frameworks have emerged to explain the reasons behind interlocks formation: management control, 
financial control, class hegemony, and resource dependency (Burt, 1983; David and Westerhuis, 
2014; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Mizruchi, 1992; Selznick, 2011; 
Sheard, 1993, 1993; Zajac, 1988).
The formation of interlocks can be investigated within the aforementioned paradigms and from the 
perspective of both directors and companies. Stokman et al. (1988) and Zajac (1988) have both 
studied interlock formations from the perspective of individuals, rather than as inter-organisational 
relationships. Useem (1986) suggests that directors sitting on multiple boards take advantage of 
the “business scan”; they expand their range of relationships and experience by being on multiple 
boards, which in turn means more board memberships for them. As Davis (1993) states in his study, 
heavily interlocked directors are more prone to be chosen for new board positions. Interlocks can 
also be considered to reflect dense social ties among an elite; the literature suggest that as well as 
an inter-organisational phenomenon, interlocks can also be viewed as an interclass phenomenon, 
and ties created for organisational purposes can have an impact on inter-firm political unity 
(Mizruchi, 1989, 1992). 
Focusing on inter-organisational ties, the purpose of director interlocks can be the establishment of 
control or coordination. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that interlocks, similar to mergers and 
acquisitions, are organisational strategies for managing the organisation’s relationship with its 
environment, for instance by tackling competitive uncertainty. This avenue of research, which has 


































































given rise to the resource dependency paradigm provides a convincing explanation why interlocks 
are formed (O’Hagan and Green, 2004). But there has been no definite answer for whether reducing 
uncertainty through interlocks means higher profits for companies. There have been suggestions 
that interlocks positively affect the profitability of companies (Burt, 1983; Carrington, 1981; 
Pennings, 1980). But the majority of studies have shown a negative correlation between the two 
(for example: Fligstein and Brantley, 1992). The literature suggests that these varying results are 
due to the different types of interlocks that are formed. For instance, Mizruchi and Stearns (1988) 
demonstrate that in a sample of 22 large US manufacturing companies, those with declining profits 
in a given year were more likely to appoint a director from a financial institution to their boards. 
Similar findings, in other business sectors, have been reported by Lang and Lockhart (1990) and 
(Richardson, 1987).  
O’Hagan and Green (2004) argue that the financial control paradigm, discussed by Mintz and 
Schwartz (1985), should be seen as a separate branch of resource dependency. This paradigm offers 
more attention to financial companies, suggesting they play a more central role than others in 
interlocking networks. 
Apart from financial resources, interlocks are also seen as opportunities for exchange of knowledge 
and strategy, and consequently increased knowledge of top decision makers  (Beckman and 
Haunschild, 2002; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Lorsch and Young, 1990; Sanders and Tuschke, 
2007; Useem, 1986). 
In his research, Useem (1982: 210) reports that several directors considered their board 
appointments as learning tools for “top management education”. Directors can also see the 
consequence of management decisions first hand in their monitoring roles, and hence gain 
knowledge on how efficient various practices are (Haunschild, 1993). Acquiring knowledge about 


































































business practice is also facilitated through communication with other directors during meetings. 
The important aspect to consider here is that the information gained in this way can be highly 
influential as it originates from trusted sources and is more up to date, compared with information 
from secondary sources (Davis, 1991; Kahneman et al., 1982; Useem, 1982; Weick, 1995).
Extant literature often discusses these interlocks from the resource-based perspective, examining 
how these interlocks act as a mechanism for knowledge and advice exchange. Furthermore, when 
these interlocks occur across sectors, it has been argued that this allows for a wider variety of 
expertise and resources to be exchange across firms. Hernández-Lara and Gonzales-Bustos (2018) 
investigate the relationship between interlock ties and firm innovative performance. They find a 
negative influence of intra-industry ties and a positive influence of extra (or inter) industry ties on 
innovation. Resource dependency theory argues that inter industry ties provide access to further 
knowledge and advice, whilst intra industry ties are more closely related to conformist behaviour 
within an industry. 
Furthermore, intra-industry links between firms often attract increased levels of regulatory interest. 
For example, in the US, this has resulted in the creation of antitrust regulation regarding intra 
industry (or sector) regulation: the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914. This act prevents anticompetitive 
behaviours, specifically prohibiting types of interlock ties (Caiazza et al., 2019). It prohibits 
interlocking directorates ties between competing companies of a certain size. This act has been 
followed by several additional statuary provisions aimed at regulating interlocks in specific 
industries, such as banking and utilities (Baccini and Marroni, 2016). This does not mean that there 
is no connection between these firms, rather they may not be directly linked. Abdelbadie and 
Salama (2019) applied a resourced based perspective to examine the impact of indirect interlock 
ties on US banking practices. Indirect interlock ties are of particular importance in the US, in the 


































































context of antitrust regulation. The European case contrasts with this, as European antitrust 
legislation does not directly tackle the issue of director interlocks; it does not follow the approach 
of the Clayton Act in the USA (Petersen, 2016). In the UK, company law is based in common law, 
and therefore does not regulate in detail the specific roles and structure of corporate boards; rather 
there is a practice of self-regulation (Johanson and Østergren, 2010). 
Although the resource dependency theory is often utilised to examine director interlocks, numerous 
other theoretical frameworks have been utilised to better understand corporate governance and 
interlock patterns. For instance, agency theory has been frequently applied to explain the negative 
relationship between firm performance and interlockings directorates. Agency theory would 
suggest that director with multiple appointments are too busy to be effective monitors within the 
firm, rather they act as a conduit for knowledge and advice between firms (Ferris et al., 2003; 
Kaczmarek et al., 2014). 
2.2.  Gender diversity & interlocking directorates 
What has been discussed so far, from the resource dependency paradigm and associated studies, 
emphasises primarily on directors and their characteristics. Their networks and connections to other 
directors can be seen as an attribute and the source of their information and knowledge, which they 
disseminate through interlocks. But we should also consider how the gender of these directors, 
more specifically interlocking directors, can act as an important resource which may be utilised by 
companies. Hence, women representation on corporate boards has become an important issue, 
extensively discussed by scholars (for example, see Buallay et al., 2020; Burke, 1997; Burke and 
Mattis, 2013; Drago and Aliberti, 2019; Kirsch, 2018; Nguyen et al., 2020; O’Hagan, 2017). 
The literature on board gender diversity is somewhat focused on identifying barriers to the 
appointment of women to corporate boards (for example Burke, 1997; Singh and Vinnicombe, 


































































2004). But a different approach is to investigate how gender diversity can contribute to board 
dynamics, processes, and performance, ultimately being translated into firm performance (Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009; Garanina and Muravyev, 2020; Green and Homroy, 2018; Gulamhussen and 
Santa, 2015; Isidro and Sobral, 2015; Lückerath-Rovers, 2013; Singh et al., 2008). These studies 
have suggested that boards with more women experience more debates, and women can have 
significant impact on decision making processes in the boardroom. Women can also bring with 
them their distinct characteristics to boards which can have an impact on their interactions. For 
example, Hillman et al. (2002), in a study of US boardrooms, found that women directors tend to 
have higher degrees, and come from non-business backgrounds.
Ruigrok et al. (2007) suggest that diversity in the boardroom results in an “increased complexity” 
of interactions between directors, which has yet to be effectively explored in scholarly work. We 
focus on the role of women since they may represent an increased complexity in boardroom 
dynamics while their individual characteristics, qualifications, and capabilities, represent a unique 
resource for companies. Looking more specifically at women directors participating in interlocks 
and taking the resource dependency paradigm, O’Hagan (2017) suggests that women interlocks 
have greater impact on corporate performance than simply larger women representation on boards. 
This is an interesting insight which supports the idea that diversity on interlocks is also beneficial 
for companies.
Other areas of the literature have found no effect on performance as a result of increased female 
representation on boards of directors (Marinova et al., 2016; Mazzotta et al., 2017), or in some 
cases a negative impact. For instance, Smith et al. (2006) note that increased gender diversity on 
boards of directors could potentially result in an ineffective board, that takes longer to make 
decisions, as conflicts can occur more easily on diverse boards. This can increase coordination 


































































costs and results in a negative impact on financial performance. Ararat and Yurtoglu (2020) find 
that female representation only predicts increased firm value when female directors have active 
roles, such as committee memberships in their study on firms in Turkey; they note that otherwise 
there is no evidence of an impact of female representation on firm performance. 
Extant literature has also examined the demographics (nationality and business education) and 
behaviours of female directors compared to their male counterparts (Bennouri et al., 2018), in 
particular in relation to risk taking behaviours (Abou-El-Sood, 2021; Belaounia et al., 2020; Lenard 
et al., 2014; Mastella et al., 2021). Much of the literature suggests that female directors are more 
risk adverse, and less competition driven (compared to male directors), resulting in less risk-taking 
behaviour. This is exemplified by Kroes (2009), when she suggest that if it was Lehman Sisters 
instead of Lehman Brothers that the crisis would not have happened the way it did. Ryan and 
Haslam (2007) note that women directors often outperform male directors on tasks with increased 
risk. However, Croson and Gneezy (2009) argue that whilst the notion that women are more risk 
adverse could apply to the general population, in managerial positions, differences in risk taking 
behaviour are smaller and even non-existent. Zalata et al. (2019) tackle the question of whether 
female CEOs’ risk and ethical behaviour actually differ compared to their male counterparts in a 
study of the US corporate system. They find that female CEOs are more risk-averse than male 
CEOs; yet this is not because they are more sensitive to ethical issues. Rigolini et al. (2021) provide 
a subsequent analysis of female CEO appointments; in their analysis of Norwegian firms, they find 
that the appointment of a female CEO, following a male CEO, tends to reduce the level of risk of 
the firm. 


































































2.3.  Board gender diversity & quotas 
The interventions that have occurred to increase the number of women on boards and diversify the 
compositions of boards justify their cause by arguing that diversified boards mean better 
perform nce for companies. For example, the European Commission in its 2012 proposal for the 
directive set to improve gender balance in listed companies (among non-executive directors) states 
that: “The proposed Directive will lead to breaking down the barriers that women face when aiming 
for board positions and to improved corporate governance, as well as enhanced company 
performance.” (European Commission, 2012, p. 5). Policy makers aiming for diversified boards 
make use of consultancy studies suggesting that companies with boardroom diversity perform 
better than others (Catalyst, 2007; Credit Suisse, 2012; McKinsey, 2007). But it is also suggested 
that addressing the question whether diversified boards improve performance needs more academic 
research, focusing on three issues: data limitations, selection, and casual inference (Adams, 2016).  
The approach by policy makers to achieve gender diversity on boards of directors varies from 
country to country (Mokadem and Muwafak, 2020). There is a number of legislative approaches 
used by policy makers, ranging from hard binding laws, soft non-binding laws, to voluntary 
approaches. An example of a hard binding law to achieve a gender balance on boards is the 
introduction of quotas; however, quotas are often a controversial issue in many countries. One of 
the most prominent examples of a hard binding law was the introduction of quotas in Norway in 
2003, to ensure 40% of directors on the boards of publicly listed firms are the underrepresented sex  
(Strøm, 2015). Non-compliance with this law would result in harsh sanctions, including heavy fines 
and even the dissolution of the firm. Hard binding legislative approaches can also be observed in 
Italy, Germany, France, and Belgium (Rebérioux and Roudaut, 2019; Seierstad and Huse, 2017). 


































































A soft non-binding legislative approach is observed in Spain, where there are limited to no 
sanctions for non-compliance. Many argue that these soft law approaches lead to minimal 
improvement in gender diversity, and often only result in short term results (de Cabo et al., 2019; 
Conde-Ruiz et al., 2019; Piscopo and Clark Muntean, 2018).  
A further approach to promote gender diversity on corporate boards is the voluntary (or self-
regulation) option. For this approach governance codes, often with a comply or explain element, 
are utilised to promote gender diversity in the boardroom. There is often debate whether this 
approach can be truly effective, especially without any legislative action or enforcement (Mensi-
Klarbach et al., 2019). An example of an institutional environment pursuing the voluntary and self-
regulation approach is the UK. Whether there are hard, soft, or voluntary measures in place to 
encourage gender equality depends on the institutional and cultural environment (Carrasco et al., 
2015).
It is important to note that the introduction of quotas in Norway was seen to result in a small 
selection of female directors with a high number of directorships, which have been referred to as 
“golden skirts” (Huse, 2012; Seierstad and Opsahl, 2011). These golden skirt directors represent 
busy or over boarded female directors. There has been much debate on the impact of directors that 
are busy or over boarded on firm performance (Cashman et al., 2012; Ferris et al., 2003). Many 
argue that directors with several appointments are ineffective having too many commitments, and 
that this especially impacts their monitoring role (Fich and Shivdasani, 2012; Hamdan, 2018). 
Others argue that whilst these busy directors are not effective monitors, they often have extensive 
contacts and connections, making them an excellent source of knowledge and advice on the board 
of directors (Field et al., 2013; Harris and Shimizu, 2004). 


































































In the UK, the regulatory body, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), which sets the UK’s 
Corporate Governance and Stewardship Codes is cautioning new regulations regarding over 
boarded directors, with the aim of encouraging these directors to resign one or more of their 
positions. The FRC suggests that there should be a clear justification for appointing any busy 
directors in the company annual report and notes that firms should carefully reflect on these types 
of appointments (FRC, 2018).
2.4.  Hypotheses 
Overall, the literature discussed clearly suggests that interlocks can be considered as a resource for 
companies to mitigate uncertainty. It is evident that interlocks are instrumental in providing a 
mechanism for transfer, whether it is for transfer of resources or knowledge. In this study, we make 
use of these findings of the literature, and we draw specifically on the idea that gender diversity on 
boards complements interlock resources. We assume here that interlocks contribute to knowledge 
transfer and proceed to explore changes in brokerage roles for directors on boards in inter- industry 
relationships.
Therefore, we derive a set of hypotheses from resource dependency theory on how firm sectoral 
brokerage, and more specifically gendered brokerage, may have an impact on a firm’s financial 
performance. Resource dependency theory argues that a firm (or board) with a high level of 
linkages to external environments is expected to better access various resources (such as knowledge 
and advice) (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). Therefore, we expect that firms that connect to other 
industries (an external environment) will perform better (in terms of accounting measures of 
performance). 
Hypothesis 1: Companies holding brokerage roles linking to companies belonging to different 
sectoral classifications will reap performance benefits from these roles. 


































































Whilst the relationship between female directors and performance is not clear, (as demonstrated in 
the extant literature), we hypothesise that female brokerage will have positive impact on firm 
performance. Female directors bring a different set of characteristics to the corporate board, 
including a different set of linkages and brokerage opportunities compared to male directors 
(Brown et al., 2002; Singh et al., 2008). Female directors contribute to board diversity, providing 
the board with a greater range of social capital, which can bridge the board to new resources 
(Booth-Bell, 2018; Larcker and Tayan, 2013; You et al., 2018). Therefore, brokerage chains 
involving female directors (or a combination of male and female directors) have the potential to 
have positive consequences for firm level outcomes (Dunn, 2012; Glass and Cook, 2016). 
Hypothesis 2: Gendered brokerage, specifically including female directors, will have increased 
performance benefits compared to male brokerage. 
This hypothesis is tested by making use of a network approach, analysing the interlocking 
directorates network to identify the brokerage positions male and female directors hold in the UK 
corporate system. 
3. Data & Methods
This study focuses on the case of the UK, an institutional setting that takes a voluntary non-binding 
approach to gender equality on boards of directors, that is very much centred on the comply or 
explain approach. This approach is a result of the anti-regulatory sentiments present in the UK, 
where there is little appetite for interventionist solutions (Doldor, 2017). In the UK, it is interest 
groups, researchers, and other civil society actors that play key roles in promoting gender diversity.  
Yet even these diversity campaigns are rarely in favour of the implementation of quotas or hard 
legislation (Sarabi and Smith, 2021; Seierstad et al., 2017), rather the argument for gender diversity 
is built around the business case (rather than the ethical consideration as observed in Norway). 


































































Civil society actors, NGOs and interest groups have been found to be key stakeholders in a range 
of sustainability issues, including gender diversity, and can shape firm practices in the long term 
(Sisaye, 2021). 
In the UK, compared to other countries which have quota or legislative regimes, there are fewer 
female directors. Therefore, this study has the potential to inform on whether it is not the level of 
female directors or diversity on the board that contributes to increased performance, but the roles 
that female directors can potentially play in linking to new sources of knowledge, advice, and 
resources. This study has the potential to inform on the business case argument for increased female 
representation on boards of directors, in an institutional environment that takes a self-regulatory 
approach. 
The firms included in the analysis belong to the UK FTSE 350; these are large and medium sized 
firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. The time period for this analysis is 2010 to 2018; 2010 
represents a milestone year for gender representation on boards of directors in the UK, along with 
the creation of the 30% club, a self-organised interest group that campaigns for increased female 
representation on FTSE boards of directors. Initially the 30% club campaigned for the top 100 
firms in the UK to have at least 30% female representation on its board of directors. In 2015, when 
this target was in sight, the group set two new objectives (Sarabi and Smith, 2021). Firstly, they 
expanded the 30% representation goal to the top 350 firms in the UK (the FTSE 350), moving 
beyond the top 100 (FTSE 100). The second goal was for 30% female representation in senior 
management within FTSE 100 companies aligning with recommendations set out in Davies 
Review. This study examines the period of 2010 to 2018, capturing the establishment of the interest 
group, and when it revised its campaign objectives. 


































































The company level data is collected from a combination of Companies House (extracted 
programmatically in R; Smith, 2019) and Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis dataset. Companies House is a 
British government website that provides information on the directors who sit on the boards of UK 
firms, such as the start and end dates of their directorships. Companies House also provides firm 
level data including details on the sector the firm operates in. This data is used to construct the 
interlocking directorate network, which is a network of directors and firms; directors are linked to 
firms when they sit on the firm’s board of directors. If a director sits on two boards, then these 
firms will interlock via the director. This network is referred to as a two-mode network; this is a 
network with two sets of actors, where ties can only occur between sets and not within (Borgatti 
and Everett, 1997). Metrics derived from this network are utilised to capture the gendered 
brokerage of a firm, which is subsequently used in a panel data analysis to test the hypotheses 
presented in this paper. Gender and sector information are utilised to construct these gendered 
brokerage metrics, where sectors are classified according to a firm’s one digit SIC code. The 
analysis is restricted to the main component of the interlocking directorate network over the time 
period; that is the firms and directors that are embedded in the largest connected part of the network. 
We disregard other components as disconnected firms are unable to properly hold a brokerage 
position. As a result, our sample consists of firms with 2169 firm-year observations. 
We make use of a two-mode variant of brokerage chains to examine how firms link to other firms 
belonging to the same or different sector in the two-mode system. The original brokerage chains 
were proposed for one-mode network and were developed by Gould and Fernandez (1989); and 
are therefore referred to as Gould-Fernandez (GF) roles. They proposed five brokerage roles that 
an actor can hold in a network while linking to actors that are members of the same or different 
groups in directed one-mode networks: coordinator, representative, gatekeeper, itinerant, and 


































































liaison. These are presented in figure (1), where the colours represent group membership. The GF 
roles have been utilised in a wide range of empirical setting to examine brokerage patterns and how 
actors link between and within different groups; including firm innovation performance research 
(Belso-Martínez et al., 2015), disaster response studies (Lind et al., 2008), and analysis of 
international trade (Smith and Sarabi, 2021b). The coordinator role captures when an actor acts as 
a broker within their own group, indicating that they hold a particular important role for group level 
coordination. The representative role captures when an actor distributes information or goods 
outside the group, on behalf of their group. The gatekeeper role captures when an actor distributes 
outside information or goods to their group. The itinerant role captures when an actor acts as an 
external broker to another group. The liaison role represents inter group brokerage, linking together 
actors belonging to different groups.
------------------------------------------
Insert Figure 1 about here.
-------------------------------------------
However, as the interlocking directorate network is a two-mode network, consisting of two sets of 
actors (firms and directors), these brokerage roles would only tell us about the linkages between 
firms belong to various sector classifications, and disregard important information about the 
directors that link them together (including gender). Therefore w  make use of the two-mode 
extension of the brokerage roles proposed by (Jasny and Lubell, 2015), which are presented in 
figure (2). The representative and gatekeeper roles are the same in an undirected case, as the only 
difference between the two is the direction of the ties. Therefore, there are four two-mode GF roles. 
In figure (2), the circles represent firms and their colours their sector. The squares represent 
directors, and the direction of the line the director gender.  For each role, there are four 
combinations of directors that link together the various firms. These roles can be read from top to 


































































bottom of the brokerage chains and include the following director configurations, male-female, 
female-male, female-female and male-male. There are four configurations for each brokerage role, 
representing various level of gender heterogeneity in the brokerage position a firm holds linking 
together firms belonging to different sectors. These brokerage roles are used to test the hypotheses, 
examining the relationship between firm performance and these types of brokerage. For instance, 
does male only brokerage has a stronger impact on performance, reinforcing the “old boys” 
network often observed in the upper echelon of management (Heemskerk and Fennema, 2009). 
------------------------------------------
Insert Figure 2 about here.
-------------------------------------------
Based on the topology we introduced earlier, we count the number of brokerage chains in our 
networks (interlocking directorate networks for years 2010 to 2018) and classify them based on the 
type of chain. 
Aligned with the work of  Jasny and Lubell (2015), we define a two-mode brokerage chain as a 
situation in which two companies are separated by a shortest path  involving two directors and the 
brokering company. The number of ties between the two companies is four in this case. If the two 
companies are also otherwise connected through only one director and via two ties, we consider 
the chain a non-brokered one, and do not include it in the count. Figure (3) depicts the difference 
between brokered and non-brokered chains. The rationale here is that in the right-hand side 
structure, the companies can connect to each other via the shortest path between them, i.e., through 
a single director, and without needing to go through the longer path. By calculating and examining 
the brokerage chains in our networks, we can determine both the dominant brokerage roles of 
companies, and consequently sectors, for each year, as well as the diversity of associated directors.  
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Insert Figure 3 about here.
-------------------------------------------
Therefore, this analysis is used to construct 16 firm level brokerage metrics (4 for each brokerage 
role) over the time period. These are then utilised in the panel data analysis to assess the interplay 
between gendered brokerage and firm performance. An accounting based measure of performance 
is utilised in this study, Return on Capital Employed (ROCE); an established performance metric 
used in the analysis of interlocking directorates and performance (Bhatt and Bhattacharya, 2015; 
Bischoff and Buchwald, 2018).
Additional company level data utilised in this analysis includes, number of employees, total assets, 
board size, and sector. Hawawini et al. (2003) argue that industry or sector characteristics matter 
more than firm specific attributes in determining performance, with the exception of dominant 
leaders in the industry. Number of employees and total assets allow for the control for firm size. 
Board size has frequently been investigated in relation to firm performance; with a selection of 
scholarly work suggesting that larger board have a negative impact on firm performance, as they 
result in poor communication and slow, ineffective decision making (Cheng, 2008; Nguyen et al., 
2016; Yermack, 1996). However, others argue that larger boards can offer positive performance 
benefits, as they are able to better undertake monitoring activities, since the board can offer a wider, 
more diverse range of opinions (Guest, 2009). 
To test the hypotheses presented in this paper, a panel data regression analysis was undertaken, 
which was implemented in the “plm” R package (Croissant and Millo, 2008). In the panel data 
regression analysis, the dependent variable was the performance metrics, ROCE. We then specified 
a number of control variables; these included number of employees (EMP), firm size (as defined 
as the log of total assets) (ASSETS), board size (BOARD SIZE), and the sector each firm belongs 


































































to (SECTOR). Resource dependency theory would argue that a larger board should perform better, 
given it will have greater opportunities to form links to critical resources (Bonn et al., 2004), and 
potentially additional interlocking opportunities.
To test the impact of the gender brokerage roles on performance, we include the four director 
configurations for each GF role in a separate model. We take the lag of the brokerage role, 
examining the number of times a firm played a specific brokerage role in the previous year. We 
take the lag, as the benefits of network ties are unlikely to be instantaneous, rather it would take 
some time to have an effect. Additionally, using the lag of the network metrics helps alleviate 
potential endogeneity effects.  
We therefore apply four models, taking the form:
𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝑡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛼5
𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸 ― 𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸 𝑅𝑂𝐿𝐸𝑡 ― 1 +  𝛼6𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸 ― 𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸 𝑅𝑂𝐿𝐸𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛼7𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸
― 𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸 𝑅𝑂𝐿𝐸𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛼8𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸 ― 𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸 𝑅𝑂𝐿𝐸𝑡 ― 1 + 𝜀 
4. Results
Table (1) presents the descriptive statistics for the firm level attributes; this indicates high levels of 
variation in firm performance (ROCE). We observe less variation in firm size (as indicated by 
assets) and number of employees. The average board size is around 9 directors; there has been 
much debate regarding the ideal board size; in Spain the Olivencia code recommends boards should 
consist of between 5 and 15 directors (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Fernández- Fernández, 
1999); there is no equivalent code for the UK case in relation to the ideal board size. We observe 
in this case, companies tend to follow this rule, with the average falling within these limits. 



































































Insert Table 1 about here.
-------------------------------------------
The distribution of the sectors among all companies recorded in our data is presented in table (2), 
which indicates the proportion of total firms belonging to each sector. We observe that financial 
sector is the most prominent; this is not surprising, given that interlocks are most prevalent amongst 
financial firms (Mizruchi, 1996; Shropshire, 2010). Therefore, financial firms are more likely to 
be present in the main component of the FTSE 350 interlock network over the time period and are 
potentially more likely to be involved in brokerage chains. 
------------------------------------------
Insert Table 2 about here.
-------------------------------------------
Figure (4) presents the number of firms from each sector holding a specific two-mode GF brokerage 
role for 2010, 2014 and 2018. Many scholars have noted that the characteristics of an industry or 
sector, influence the social responsibility of the firm (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000). King et al. 
(2002) note that the visibility of a sector can influence a firm’s corporate social responsibility 
behaviour, given that firms operating in these sectors will be visible, and more ethical behaviours 
may have reputational benefits. 
In figure (4) we observe that a large number of firms in the finance, insurance, and real estate sector 
have consistently held brokerage positions, across the various roles. Firms with a coordinator role 
are chiefly from the finance sector, especially in 2010; in 2014 and 2018 firms from other sectors 
began to hold these positions, but the majority were still from the finance sector. 
For coordinator chains, the majority are male – male, however, we observe an increase in female 
directors’ involvement in these chains in 2018.  For itinerant roles, there has been an increase in 
the number of female-female chains over time, going from only a handful in the wholesale & retail 


































































trade sector to a wider variety of sectors in 2010. The number of chains involving female directors 
had overtaken the male dominated brokerage chains by 2018, perhaps reflecting the overall trends 
in the FTSE 350 of increasing female representation (Sarabi and Smith, 2021). Firms belonging to 
finance, manufacturing (both categories), transportation, communications, electric, gas & sanitary 
service sectors have consistently held representative/gatekeeper roles. Similar to the patterns 
observed for itinerant and coordinator roles, there has been an increase in participation of female 
director in creating the representative/gatekeeper brokerage chains. This potentially points towards 
the success of interest groups (such as the 30% club) in achieving an increase in females playing 
key roles in the UK corporate system since 2010. For liaison role, the number of female-female 
chains has drastically increased from 2014 to 2018, with these frequently observed in the financial 
and manufacturing sectors. 
------------------------------------------
Insert Figure 4 about here.
-------------------------------------------
The results of the panel data analysis are presented in table (3). The chain type refers to the 
brokerage chain of the two-mode GF role model for each specific model, for instance in the 
RepGate model the Male-Male role refers to the Male-Male Representative/Gatekeeper GF role.  
When implementing the model estimation, a number of robustness checks were carried out. Firstly, 
to check the issue of multicollinearity, we calculated the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each 
model. Gujarati et al. (2012) note that an independent variable with a VIF higher than 10 would 
represent a serious multicollinearity issue. Across all four models, and for all of the independent 
variables, the VIF was in the acceptable range (less than 2). Therefore, we are confident that our 
independent variables are not suffering from a serious collinearity problem. A further robustness 
check that was implemented was for autocorrelation. In panel data or time series analysis, (as 


































































undertaken in this paper), there is a presupposition of the stability of the series (Hawaj and Buallay, 
2021). If the time series is non-stationary, then autocorrelation can occur (Gujarati et al., 2012). In 
order to check if there is a problem of autocorrelation in the models, the Durbin–Watson (DW) test 
is employed. If the DW values are within the range of 1.5 – 2.5, then this indicates that there is no 
autocorrelation problem that would impact the results. For the models presented in table (4) the 
DW values were all within the required range. 
The results presented in table (3) indicate that larger firms, as defined by log of assets, are 
negatively associated with accounting performance (Return on Capital Employed). Board size is 
not significantly associated with this measure of performance. The sector classification parameters 
indicate whether firms belonging to the sector perform better than the baseline sector: mining and 
construction. These results indicate that firm belonging to the personal and supporting business 
service sector and to a lesser extent the wholesale and retail trade sector, perform better in terms of 
ROCE. The significant sector results confirm existing findings from the literature, that sector or 
industry groupings can impact a firm’s performance levels (Moura‐Leite et al., 2012; Powell, 1996; 
Short et al., 2007). 
------------------------------------------
Insert Table 3 about here.
-------------------------------------------
The majority of brokerage roles are non-significant, more specifically, the Representative-
Gatekeeper, Itinerant, and Coordinator roles. However, after controlling for firm size, number of 
employees, and sector classification, the two-mode brokerage roles that have a significant impact 
on performance are the Liaison roles. In particular, there is a positive liaison effect on performance 
when there is heterogeneity in the directors creating the brokerage ties. Male-female and female-
male chains have a significant and large, positive effect on performance. Whereas when a firm 


































































plays a liaison role through same gender ties, there is a negative and (weakly) significant effect on 
performance. This highlights the need to examine gender patterns and provides support for 
hypothesis (1) presented in this study: heterogeneity in linkages has positive performance effects. 
This has mixed support for the second hypothesis, as male-female/female-male chains have a 
positive impact, indicating potential brokerage benefits of female directors on firm boards. Yet 
there is a negative female-female effect, suggesting that chains consisting of one gender are 
unlikely to bring new sources of advice and resources to a firm.   
Figure (4) highlights that firms belonging to the finance, manufacturing (both categories) and 
transportation, communications, electric, gas & sanitary service sectors, hold more male-female 
and female-male liaison roles; and therefore, reap performance related benefit from these ties. 
5. Alternative measure of firm performance
In order to check the robustness of the results presented in this paper, we employ the modelling 
approach to a further measure of firm performance, Return on Equity (ROE). A range of extant 
literature uses this profitability ratio as a measure of firm performance (including the works of 
Bennouri et al., 2018; Lau, 2016; Mashayekhi and Bazaz, 2008). Table (4) presents the modelling 
results with ROE as the dependent variable. For the control variables, we observe that board size 
is non-significant, this result is in line with the findings of Zabri et al. (2016) in their analysis of 
top Malaysian firms. In this analysis, larger firms (according to assets) have a reduced ROE, as 
indicated by the negative and significant assets variable, this follows a similar pattern as the ROCE 
modelling results. 
------------------------------------------
Insert Table 4 about here.
-------------------------------------------


































































However, a clear point to note here is that the GF brokerage roles are mainly non-significant for 
the case of ROE, with the exception of the all-male itinerant brokerage chain, which is negative 
and (weakly) significant. This suggests that a firm acting as an external broker to a different sector 
through its male directors dampens firm performance, according to this profitability ratio. The other 
non-significant results suggest that the various brokerage roles do not offer a firm performance 
advantages in terms of ROE (both in terms of male and female chains). Detthamrong et al., (2017) 
identify in their analysis of firms in Thailand, that the proportion of female directors on the board 
is not significantly associated with firm performance, as measured by ROE.  The work of Watson 
(2007) notes in his examination of Australian firms, that network ties have a positive relationship 
between firm survival and growth, but not ROE. The results presented in table (4) are in line with 
Watson (2007). Bennouri et al. (2018) offers some explanation for the non-significant brokerage 
role results observed in table (4), and the difference between ROCE results and ROE results. They 
find that the effects of different types of director attributes (including gender) on different types of 
performance (including ROE) was not uniform. Further work could explore the impact of 
brokerage on other measures of firm performance, more specifically market-based measures of 
performance, to unpack the interplay between gender, intersectoral linkages, and firm performance. 
6. Discussion & conclusion
In this paper, we proposed two hypotheses regarding the impact of gender intersectoral firm ties 
on performance. The first was that firms with linkages to firms belonging to different sector would 
benefit from such ties because of gaining access to different knowledge and resources. The second 
was that gendered brokerage, involving female directors would have a positive effect on firm 
performance. We tested these hypotheses through the use of metrics derived from social network 
analysis in a panel data regression, more specifically the use of two mode GF roles proposed by 


































































(Jasny and Lubell, 2015).  The results of the analysis provide support for the first hypothesis, where 
the only significant effects were for liaison roles, in which firms link to other firms belonging to 
different sectors (no intra sector linkages). When there was the presence of both male and female 
directors in these chains, there was a positive effect on performance, suggesting support for 
hypothesis 1. Furthermore, the roles with intra-sectoral ties were non-significant, indicating no 
significant relationship with this accounting-based measure of performance (ROCE). This provides 
support for the resource dependency theory hypothesis, that links to firms belonging to different 
sectors are more likely to bring new sources of knowledge, advice, and resources, with performance 
enhancing effects. 
However, there is mixed support for the second hypothesis, as indicated by the brokerage chain 
results in the liaison model given in table (3). In the case of brokerage chains involving both male 
and female directors, linking to firms belonging to different sector has a positive impact on firm 
performance. Directors of the same gender linking to firms belonging to different sectors has a 
negative and weakly significant impact on performance. Haynes and Hillman (2010) note that 
heterogeneity in boards is key for firm development, and firm with heterogeneous boards are more 
likely to pursue new strategies. Our findings are in line with Haynes and Hillman (2010), where 
heterogeneity in brokerage chains, in terms of both industry and gender, is associated with a 
positive impact on firm performance. This highlights that when examining the impact of firm ties 
via the interlock network on performance, the characteristics of the directors, especially their 
gender, should not be neglected as this significantly shapes the benefits a firm reaps from these 
network ties. This work highlights that when examining the business case for appointing female 
directors to a firm, it is not only their individual characteristics that contribute to the business case, 
but also their network ties and potential to provide firm brokerage opportunities. This is particularly 


































































important when considering the institutional environment of the UK, or any country which employs 
a voluntary approach, as the business case is often used by interest groups and other campaigners 
to encourage gender equality on corporate boards. 
However, this pattern was only observed for the case of ROCE, and not for the profitability ratio, 
ROE. For ROE, there was no support for the second hypothesis, where many of the GF brokerage 
roles had a non-significant (or weakly significant) relationship with ROE. Future work could seek 
to examine if gendered brokerage has the same impact on other measures of firm performance, 
more specifically market-based measures of performance. A further avenue for future research 
would be to explore various other attributes of the directors and how their work history may shape 
the impact of brokerage on firm performance, rather than focusing solely on directors’ gender.  
Finally, the results from the ROCE models highlights a need to better understand when 
heterogeneity in gendered brokerage chains gives rise to an increased firm performance. This 
suggests there is a need to further examine heterogenous brokerage chains (male-female and 
female-male liaison chains) in more detail, to identify who the directors and firms are in these key 
positions. 



































































Abdelbadie, R.A. and Salama, A. (2019), “Corporate governance and financial stability in US 
banks: Do indirect interlocks matter?”, Journal of Business Research, Vol. 104, pp. 85–
105.
Abou-El-Sood, H. (2021), “Board gender diversity, power, and bank risk taking”, International 
Review of Financial Analysis, Vol. 75, p. 101733.
Adams, R.B. (2016), “Women on boards: The superheroes of tomorrow?”, The Leadership 
Quarterly, Vol. 27 No. 3, pp. 371–386.
Adams, R.B. and Ferreira, D. (2009), “Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance 
and performance”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 94 No. 2, pp. 291–309.
Ararat, M. and Yurtoglu, B.B. (2020), “Female directors, board committees, and firm 
performance: Time-series evidence from Turkey”, Emerging Markets Review, p. 100768.
Baccini, A. and Marroni, L. (2016), “Regulation of interlocking directorates in the financial 
sector: a comparative case study”, European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 41 No. 
2, pp. 431–457.
Beckman, C.M. and Haunschild, P.R. (2002), “Network learning: The effects of partners’ 
heterogeneity of experience on corporate acquisitions”, Administrative Science Quarterly, 
Vol. 47 No. 1, pp. 92–124.
Belaounia, S., Tao, R. and Zhao, H. (2020), “Gender equality’s impact on female directors’ 
efficacy: A multi-country study”, International Business Review, Vol. 29 No. 5, p. 
101737.
Belso-Martínez, J.A., Molina-Morales, F.X. and Martínez-Cháfer, L. (2015), “Contributions of 
brokerage roles to firms’ innovation in a confectionery cluster”, Technology Analysis & 
Strategic Management, Vol. 27 No. 9, pp. 1014–1030.


































































Bennouri, M., Chtioui, T., Nagati, H. and Nekhili, M. (2018), “Female board directorship and 
firm performance: What really matters?”, Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 88, pp. 
267–291.
Bhatt, R.R. and Bhattacharya, S. (2015), “Do board characteristics impact firm performance? An 
agency and resource dependency theory perspective”, Asia-Pacific Journal of 
Management Research and Innovation, Vol. 11 No. 4, pp. 274–287.
Bischoff, O. and Buchwald, A. (2018), “Horizontal and Vertical Firm Networks, Corporate 
Performance and Product Market Competition”, Journal of Industry Competition & 
Trade, Vol. 18 No. 1, pp. 25–45.
Bonn, I., Yoshikawa, T. and Phan, P.H. (2004), “Effects of board structure on firm performance: 
A comparison between Japan and Australia”, Asian Business & Management, Vol. 3 No. 
1, pp. 105–125.
Booth-Bell, D. (2018), “Social capital as a new board diversity rationale for enhanced corporate 
governance”, Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 
Vol. 18 No. 3, pp. 425–439.
Borgatti, S.P. and Everett, M.G. (1997), “Network analysis of 2-mode data”, Social Networks, 
Vol. 19 No. 3, pp. 243–269.
Brown, D., Brown, D.L. and Anastasopoulos, V. (2002), “Women on boards: Not just the right 
thing... but the" bright" thing”, Conference Board of Canada.
Buallay, A., Hamdan, R., Barone, E. and Hamdan, A. (2020), “Increasing female participation on 
boards: Effects on sustainability reporting”, International Journal of Finance & 
Economics, pp. 1–14.
Burke, R.J. (1997), “Women directors: selection, acceptance and benefits of board membership”, 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 5 No. 3, pp. 118–125.


































































Burke, R.J. and Mattis, M.C. (2013), Women on Corporate Boards of Directors: International 
Challenges and Opportunities, Vol. 14, Springer Science & Business Media.
Burt, R.S. (1982), Toward a Structural Theory of Action: Network Models of Social Structure, 
Perception, and Action, Academic Pr.
Burt, R.S. (1983), Corporate Profits and Cooptation: Networks of Market Constraints and 
Directorate Ties in the American Economy, Academic Press New York.
de Cabo, R.M., Terjesen, S., Escot, L. and Gimeno, R. (2019), “Do ‘soft law’board gender quotas 
work? Evidence from a natural experiment”, European Management Journal, Elsevier, 
Vol. 37 No. 5, pp. 611–624.
Cadbury, A. (1992), Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 
Vol. 1, Gee.
Caiazza, R., Cannella Jr, A.A., Phan, P.H. and Simoni, M. (2019), “An institutional contingency 
perspective of interlocking directorates”, International Journal of Management Reviews, 
Vol. 21 No. 3, pp. 277–293.
Campbell, K. and Mínguez-Vera, A. (2008), “Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm 
Financial Performance”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 83 No. 3, pp. 435–451.
Carpenter, M. and Westphal, J. (2001), “The strategic context of external network ties: 
Examining the impact of director appointments on board involvement in strategic decision 
making”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 44 No. 4, pp. 639–660.
Carrasco, A., Francoeur, C., Labelle, R., Laffarga, J. and Ruiz-Barbadillo, E. (2015), “Appointing 
Women to Boards: Is There a Cultural Bias?”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 129 No. 2, 
pp. 429–444.
Carrington, P.J. (1981), Horizontal Co-Optation through Corporate Interlocks., University of 
Toronto, Toronto.


































































Cashman, G.D., Gillan, S.L. and Jun, C. (2012), “Going overboard? On busy directors and firm 
value”, Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, Vol. 36 No. 12, pp. 3248–3259.
Catalyst. (2007), The Bottom Line: Corporate Performance and Women’s Representation on 
Boards, Women and Men is US Corporate Leadership. Same workplace, different ….
Cheng, S. (2008), “Board size and the variability of corporate performance”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Elsevier, Vol. 87 No. 1, pp. 157–176.
Conde-Ruiz, J.I., García, M. and Yáñez, M. (2019), “Does a ‘soft’ board gender quotas policy 
work?”, Applied Economic Analysis, Emerald Publishing Limited.
Credit Suisse. (2012), Gender Diversity and Corporate Performance, Credit Suisse, Research 
Institute.
Croissant, Y. and Millo, G. (2008), “Panel data econometrics in R: The plm package”, Journal of 
Statistical Software, Vol. 27 No. 2, pp. 1–43.
Croson, R. and Gneezy, U. (2009), “Gender Differences in Preferences”, Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. 47 No. 2, pp. 448–474.
David, T. and Westerhuis, G. (2014), The Power of Corporate Networks: A Comparative and 
Historical Perspective, Routledge.
Davis, G.F. (1991), “Agents without principles? The spread of the poison pill through the 
intercorporate network.”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36 No. 4, pp. 583–613.
Davis, G.F. (1993), “Who gets ahead in the market for corporate directors: the political economy 
of multiple board memberships.”, Academy of Management Proceedings, Vol. 1993, 
Academy of Management Briarcliff Manor, NY 10510, pp. 202–206.
Detthamrong, U., Chancharat, N. and Vithessonthi, C. (2017), “Corporate governance, capital 
structure and firm performance: Evidence from Thailand”, Research in International 
Business and Finance, Vol. 42, pp. 689–709.


































































DiMaggio, P.J. and Powell, W.W. (1983), “The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism 
and collective rationality in organizational fields”, American Sociological Review, pp. 
147–160.
Doldor, E. (2017), “UK: The merits and shortcomings of a voluntary approach”, Gender 
Diversity in the Boardroom, Springer, pp. 13–44.
Drago, C. and Aliberti, L.A. (2019), “Interlocking Directorship Networks and Gender: A 
Bibliometric Analysis”, in Paoloni, P. and Lombardi, R. (Eds.), Advances in Gender and 
Cultural Research in Business and Economics, Springer International Publishing, pp. 
115–136.
Dunn, P. (2012), “Breaking the boardroom gender barrier: the human capital of female corporate 
directors”, Journal of Management & Governance, Vol. 16 No. 4, pp. 557–570.
European Commission. (2012), “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies 
listed on stock exchanges and related measures”, European Commission, Brussels.
Fernández- Fernández, J.-L. (1999), “Ethics and the Board of Directors in Spain: The Olivencia 
Code of Good Governance”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 22 No. 3, pp. 233–247.
Fernandez, R.M. and Gould, R.V. (1994), “A dilemma of state power: Brokerage and influence in 
the national health policy domain”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 99 No. 6, pp. 
1455–1491.
Ferris, S.P., Jagannathan, M. and Pritchard, A.C. (2003), “Too busy to mind the business? 
Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 
58 No. 3, pp. 1087–1111.


































































Fich, E.M. and Shivdasani, A. (2012), “Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?”, in Boubaker, S., 
Nguyen, B.D. and Nguyen, D.K. (Eds.), Corporate Governance: Recent Developments 
and New Trends, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp. 221–258.
Field, L., Lowry, M. and Mkrtchyan, A. (2013), “Are busy boards detrimental?”, Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 109 No. 1, pp. 63–82.
Fligstein, N. and Brantley, P. (1992), “Bank control, owner control, or organizational dynamics: 
Who controls the large modern corporation?”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 98 
No. 2, pp. 280–307.
FRC. (2018), “The UK corporate governance code”, Financial Reporting Council, available at: 
www.frc. org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-4841-95b0-d2f4f48069a2/2018-UK-
Corpoate-Governance- Code-FINAL.pdf.
Garanina, T. and Muravyev, A. (2020), “The gender composition of corporate boards and firm 
performance: Evidence from Russia”, Emerging Markets Review, p. 100772.
Glass, C. and Cook, A. (2016), “Leading at the top: Understanding women’s challenges above 
the glass ceiling”, The Leadership Quarterly, Vol. 27 No. 1, pp. 51–63.
Gould, R.V. and Fernandez, R.M. (1989), “Structures of mediation: A formal approach to 
brokerage in transaction networks”, Sociological Methodology, pp. 89–126.
Granovetter, M. (1985), “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness”, American Journal of Sociology, University of Chicago Press, Vol. 91 
No. 3, pp. 481–510.
Green, C.P. and Homroy, S. (2018), “Female directors, board committees and firm performance”, 
European Economic Review, Vol. 102, pp. 19–38.
Guest, P.M. (2009), “The impact of board size on firm performance: evidence from the UK”, The 
European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis, Vol. 15 No. 4, pp. 385–404.


































































Gujarati, D.N., Porter, D.C. and Gunasekar, S. (2012), Basic Econometrics, Tata McGraw-Hill 
Education.
Gulamhussen, M.A. and Santa, S.F. (2015), “Female directors in bank boardrooms and their 
influence on performance and risk-taking”, Global Finance Journal, Vol. 28, pp. 10–23.
Gulati, R. (1995), “Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for contractual 
choice in alliances”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 38 No. 1, pp. 85–112.
Hamdan, A. (2018), “Board interlocking and firm performance: The role of foreign ownership in 
Saudi Arabia”, International Journal of Managerial Finance, Emerald Publishing 
Limited.
Harris, I.C. and Shimizu, K. (2004), “Too Busy To Serve? An Examination of the Influence of 
Overboarded Directors”, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 41 No. 5, pp. 775–798.
Haunschild, P. and Beckman, C. (1998), “When do interlocks matter?: Alternate sources of 
information and interlock influence”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 43 No. 4, 
pp. 815–844.
Haunschild, P.R. (1993), “Interorganizational Imitation: The Impact of Interlocks on Corporate 
Acquisition Activity”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 38 No. 4, pp. 564–592.
Hawaj, A.Y.A. and Buallay, A.M. (2021), “A worldwide sectorial analysis of sustainability 
reporting and its impact on firm performance”, Journal of Sustainable Finance & 
Investment, Taylor & Francis, Vol. 0 No. 0, pp. 1–25.
Hawawini, G., Subramanian, V. and Verdin, P. (2003), “Is performance driven by industry-or 
firm-specific factors? A new look at the evidence”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 
24 No. 1, pp. 1–16.
Haynes, K.T. and Hillman, A. (2010), “The effect of board capital and CEO power on strategic 
change”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 31 No. 11, pp. 1145–1163.


































































Heemskerk, E. and Fennema, M. (2009), “Network Dynamics of the Dutch Business Elite”, 
International Sociology, Vol. 24 No. 6, pp. 807–832.
Heemskerk, E.M., Fennema, M. and Carroll, W.K. (2016), “The global corporate elite after the 
financial crisis: evidence from the transnational network of interlocking directorates”, 
Global Networks, Vol. 16 No. 1, pp. 68–88.
Hernández-Lara, A.B. and Gonzales-Bustos, J.P. (2018), “The impact of interlocking directorates 
on innovation: the effects of business and social ties”, Management Decision, available 
at:https://doi.org/10.1108/MD-11-2017-1186.
Higgs, D. (2003), “Review of the role and effectiveness of nonexecutive directors”, available at: 
www.dti.gov.uk/cld/non_execs_review.
Hillman, A.J., Cannella, A.A. and Harris, I.C. (2002), “Women and Racial Minorities in the 
Boardroom: How Do Directors Differ?”, Journal of Management, Vol. 28 No. 6, pp. 747–
763.
Hillman, A.J. and Dalziel, T. (2003), “Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating 
agency and resource dependence perspectives”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 28 
No. 3, pp. 383–396.
Huse, M. (2012), “The ‘Golden Skirts’: Lessons from Norway about Women on Corporate 
Boards of Directors”, Diversity Quotas, Diverse Perspectives, Routledge.
Isidro, H. and Sobral, M. (2015), “The Effects of Women on Corporate Boards on Firm Value, 
Financial Performance, and Ethical and Social Compliance”, Journal of Business Ethics, 
Vol. 132 No. 1, pp. 1–19.
Jasny, L. and Lubell, M. (2015), “Two-mode brokerage in policy networks”, Social Networks, 
Vol. 41, pp. 36–47.


































































Johanson, D. and Østergren, K. (2010), “The movement toward independent directors on boards: 
A comparative analysis of Sweden and the UK”, Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, Vol. 18 No. 6, pp. 527–539.
Kaczmarek, S., Kimino, S. and Pye, A. (2014), “Interlocking directorships and firm performance 
in highly regulated sectors: the moderating impact of board diversity”, Journal of 
Management & Governance, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 347–372.
Kahneman, D., Slovic, S.P., Slovic, P. and Tversky, A. (1982), Judgment under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge university press.
King, A.A., Lenox, M.J. and Barnett, M.L. (2002), “Strategic responses to the reputation 
commons problem”, Organizations, Policy and the Natural Environment: Institutional 
and Strategic Perspectives, Stanford University Press Stanford, CA, Vol. 43 No. 1, pp. 
393–406.
Kirsch, A. (2018), “The gender composition of corporate boards: A review and research agenda”, 
The Leadership Quarterly, Vol. 29 No. 2, pp. 346–364.
Kroes, N. (2009), Europe–Good for Women and Good for Ireland, Speech.
Lang, J.R. and Lockhart, D.E. (1990), “Increased environmental uncertainty and changes in board 
linkage patterns”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 33 No. 1, pp. 106–128.
Larcker, D.F. and Tayan, B. (2013), “Pioneering women on boards: Pathways of the first female 
directors”, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Closer Look 
Series: Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corporate Governance and Leadership No. 
CGRP-35.
Lau, C.K. (2016), “How corporate derivatives use impact firm performance?”, Pacific-Basin 
Finance Journal, Vol. 40, pp. 102–114.


































































Lenard, M.J., Yu, B., Anne York, E. and Wu, S. (2014), “Impact of board gender diversity on 
firm risk”, Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Vol. 40 No. 8, pp. 
787–803.
Lind, B.E., Tirado, M., Butts, C.T. and Petrescu-Prahova, M. (2008), “Brokerage roles in disaster 
response: organisational mediation in the wake of Hurricane Katrina”, International 
Journal o  Emergency Management, Vol. 5 No. 1–2, pp. 75–99.
Lorsch, J. and Young, J. (1990), “Pawns or potentates: The reality of America’s corporate 
boards”, Academy of Management Perspectives, Vol. 4 No. 4, pp. 85–87.
Lückerath-Rovers, M. (2013), “Women on boards and firm performance”, Journal of 
Management & Governance, Vol. 17 No. 2, pp. 491–509.
Marinova, J., Plantenga, J. and Remery, C. (2016), “Gender diversity and firm performance: 
evidence from Dutch and Danish boardrooms”, The International Journal of Human 
Resource Management, Vol. 27 No. 15, pp. 1777–1790.
Mashayekhi, B. and Bazaz, M.S. (2008), “Corporate Governance and Firm Performance in Iran”, 
Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics, Vol. 4 No. 2, pp. 156–172.
Mastella, M., Vancin, D., Perlin, M. and Kirch, G. (2021), “Board gender diversity: performance 
and risk of Brazilian firms”, Gender in Management: An International Journal, Emerald 
Publishing Limited.
Mazzotta, R., Bronzetti, G. and Baldini, M.A. (2017), “Does board diversity affect firm 
performance? Evidence from the Italian financial sector”, International Journal of 
Business Governance and Ethics, Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 65–89.
McKinsey. (2007), Women Matter: Gender Diversity, a Corporate Performance Driver, 
McKinsey.


































































McWilliams, A. and Siegel, D. (2000), “Corporate social responsibility and financial 
performance: correlation or misspecification?”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 21 
No. 5, pp. 603–609.
Mensi-Klarbach, H., Leixnering, S. and Schiffinger, M. (2019), “The carrot or the stick: Self-
regulation for gender-diverse boards via codes of good governance”, Journal of Business 
Ethics, pp. 1–17.
Mintz, B.A. and Schwartz, M. (1985), The Power Structure of American Business, University of 
Chicago Press.
Mizruchi, M.S. (1989), “Similarity of political behavior among large American corporations”, 
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 95 No. 2, pp. 401–424.
Mizruchi, M.S. (1992), The Structure of Corporate Political Action: Interfirm Relations and 
Their Consequences, Harvard University Press.
Mizruchi, M.S. (1996), “What Do Interlocks Do? An Analysis, Critique, and Assessment of 
Research on Interlocking Directorates”, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 22, pp. 271–
298.
Mizruchi, M.S. and Stearns, L.B. (1988), “A Longitudinal Study of the Formation of Interlocking 
Directorates”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 33 No. 2, pp. 194–210.
Mokadem, W. and Muwafak, B.M. (2020), “The Difference of the Theoretical Approach of 
Corporate Social Responsibility Between the European Union and United States of 
America”, International Journal of Business Ethics and Governance, Vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 1–
13.
Moura‐Leite, R.C., Padgett, R.C. and Galan, J.I. (2012), “Is social responsibility driven by 
industry or firm‐specific factors?”, Management Decision, Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited, Vol. 50 No. 7, pp. 1200–1221.


































































Nguyen, P., Rahman, N., Tong, A. and Zhao, R. (2016), “Board size and firm value: evidence 
from Australia”, Journal of Management & Governance, Springer, Vol. 20 No. 4, pp. 
851–873.
Nguyen, T.H.H., Ntim, C.G. and Malagila, J.K. (2020), “Women on corporate boards and 
corporate financial and non-financial performance: A systematic literature review and 
future research agenda”, International Review of Financial Analysis, Vol. 71, p. 101554.
Nicholson, G.J. and Kiel, G.C. (2007), “Can directors impact performance? A case-based test of 
three theories of corporate governance”, Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, Vol. 15 No. 4, pp. 585–608.
O’Hagan, S. and Green, M. (2004), “Corporate knowledge transfer via interlocking directorates: 
a network analysis approach”, Geoforum, Vol. 35 No. 1, pp. 127–139.
O’Hagan, S.B. (2017), “An exploration of gender, interlocking directorates, and corporate 
performance”, International Journal of Gender and Entrepreneurship, Vol. 9 No. 3, pp. 
269–282.
Pennings, J.M. (1980), Interlocking Directorates: Origins and Consequences of Connections 
among Organizations’ Board of Directors, Jossey-Bass.
Petersen, V. (2016), “Interlocking Directorates in the European Union: An Argument for Their 
Restriction”, European Business Law Review, Vol. 27 No. 6, pp. 821–864.
Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G.R. (1978), “The external control of organizations: A resource 
dependence approach”, NY: Harper and Row Publishers.
Piscopo, J.M. and Clark Muntean, S. (2018), “Corporate quotas and symbolic politics in 
advanced democracies”, Journal of Women, Politics & Policy, Taylor & Francis, Vol. 39 
No. 3, pp. 285–309.


































































Powell, T.C. (1996), “How Much Does Industry Matter? An Alternative Empirical Test”, 
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 17 No. 4, pp. 323–334.
Rebérioux, A. and Roudaut, G. (2019), “The Role of Rookie Female Directors in a Post-Quota 
Period: Gender Inequalities within French Boards”, Industrial Relations: A Journal of 
Economy and Society, Vol. 58 No. 3, pp. 423–483.
Richardson, R.J. (1987), “Directorship interlocks and corporate profitability”, Administrative 
Science Quarterly, pp. 367–386.
Rigolini, A., Gabaldon, P. and Le Bruyn Goldeng, E. (2021), “CEO succession with gender 
change in troubled companies: The effect of a new woman CEO on firm risk and firm risk 
perceived”, Scandinavian Journal of Management, Vol. 37 No. 1, p. 101138.
Ruigrok, W., Peck, S. and Tacheva, S. (2007), “Nationality and gender diversity on Swiss 
corporate boards”, Corporate Governance- an International Review, Vol. 15 No. 4, pp. 
546–557.
Ryan, M.K. and Haslam, S.A. (2007), “The Glass Cliff: Exploring the Dynamics Surrounding the 
Appointment of Women to Precarious Leadership Positions”, The Academy of 
Management Review, Academy of Management, Vol. 32 No. 2, pp. 549–572.
Sanders, W.G. and Tuschke, A. (2007), “The adoption of institutionally contested organizational 
practices: The emergence of stock option pay in Germany”, Academy of Management 
Journal, Vol. 50 No. 1, pp. 33–56.
Sarabi, Y. and Smith, M. (2021), “Busy female directors: an exploratory analysis of the impact of 
quotas and interest groups”, Gender in Management: An International Journal, Emerald 
Publishing Limited, Vol. 36 No. 3, pp. 368–385.
Seierstad, C. and Huse, M. (2017), “Gender Quotas on Corporate Boards in Norway: Ten Years 
Later and Lessons Learned”, in Seierstad, C., Gabaldon, P. and Mensi-Klarbach, H. 


































































(Eds.), Gender Diversity in the Boardroom: Volume 1: The Use of Different Quota 
Regulations, Springer International Publishing, Cham, pp. 11–45.
Seierstad, C. and Opsahl, T. (2011), “For the few not the many? The effects of affirmative action 
on presence, prominence, and social capital of women directors in Norway”, 
Scandinavian Journal of Management, Vol. 27 No. 1, pp. 44–54.
Seierstad, C., Warner-Søderholm, G., Torchia, M. and Huse, M. (2017), “Increasing the Number 
of Women on Boards: The Role of Actors and Processes”, Journal of Business Ethics, 
Vol. 141 No. 2, pp. 289–315.
Selznick, P. (2011), Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation, Quid Pro 
Books.
Sheard, P. (1993), The Economics of Interlocking Shareholding in Japan, Center for Economic 
Policy Research, Stanford University.
Short, J.C., Ketchen, D.J., Palmer, T.B. and Hult, G.T.M. (2007), “Firm, strategic group, and 
industry influences on performance”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 28 No. 2, pp. 
147–167.
Shropshire, C. (2010), “The role of the interlocking director and board receptivity in the diffusion 
of practices”, Academy of Management Review, Academy of Management Briarcliff 
Manor, NY, Vol. 35 No. 2, pp. 246–264.
Singh, V., Terjesen, S. and Vinnicombe, S. (2008), “Newly appointed directors in the 
boardroom:: How do women and men differ?”, European Management Journal, Vol. 26 
No. 1, pp. 48–58.
Singh, V. and Vinnicombe, S. (2004), “Why so few women directors in top UK boardrooms? 
Evidence and theoretical explanations”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
Vol. 12 No. 4, pp. 479–488.


































































Sisaye, S. (2021), “The influence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on the 
development of voluntary sustainability accounting reporting rules”, Journal of Business 
and Socio-Economic Development, Vol. ahead-of-print No. ahead-of-print, available 
at:https://doi.org/10.1108/JBSED-02-2021-0017.
Smith, M. (2019), CompaniesHouse: Extract & Process Companies House Data in R, available 
at: https://github.com/MatthewSmith430/CompaniesHouse.
Smith, M. and Sarabi, Y. (2021a), “‘What do interlocks do’ revisited – a bibliometric analysis”, 
Management Research Review, Emerald Publishing Limited, Vol. 44 No. 4, pp. 642–659.
Smith, M. and Sarabi, Y. (2021b), “UK trading patterns within and between regions in the 
automotive sector—A network analysis”, The World Economy, Vol. 44 No. 2, pp. 510–
529.
Smith, N., Smith, V. and Verner, M. (2006), “Do women in top management affect firm 
performance? A panel study of 2,500 Danish firms”, International Journal of Productivity 
and Performance Management, Vol. 55 No. 7, pp. 569–593.
Stokman, F.N., Van der Knoop, J. and Wasseur, F.W. (1988), “Interlocks in the Netherlands: 
Stability and careers in the period 1960–1980”, Social Networks, Vol. 10 No. 2, pp. 183–
208.
Strøm, R.Ø. (2015), “Gender discrimination before mandated quotas? Evidence from Norway: 
1989–2002”, Scandinavian Journal of Management, Vol. 31 No. 3, pp. 303–315.
Tyson, L. (2003), “The Tyson report on the recruitment and development of nonexecutive 
directors”, available at: www.london.edu/tysonreport.
Useem, M. (1982), “Classwide Rationality in the Politics of Managers and Directors of Large 
Corporations in the United States and Great Britain”, Administrative Science Quarterly, 


































































[Sage Publications, Inc., Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University], 
Vol. 27 No. 2, pp. 199–226.
Useem, M. (1986), The Inner Circle: Large Corporations and the Rise of Business Political 
Activity in the US and UK, Oxford University Press.
Watson, J. (2007), “Modeling the relationship between networking and firm performance”, 
Journal o  Business Venturing, Vol. 22 No. 6, pp. 852–874.
Weick, K.E. (1995), Sensemaking in Organizations, Vol. 3, Sage.
Yermack, D. (1996), “Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors”, 
Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Vol. 40 No. 2, pp. 185–211.
You, J., Terjesen, S. and Bilimoria, D. (2018), “Women in the Upper Echelons: Women on 
Corporate Boards and in Top Management Teams”, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of 
Business and Management, available 
at:https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190224851.013.46.
Zabri, S.M., Ahmad, K. and Wah, K.K. (2016), “Corporate governance practices and firm 
performance: Evidence from top 100 public listed companies in Malaysia”, Procedia 
Economics and Finance, Elsevier, Vol. 35, pp. 287–296.
Zajac, E.J. (1988), “Interlocking directorates as an interorganizational strategy: A test of critical 
assumptions”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 31 No. 2, pp. 428–438.
Zalata, A.M., Ntim, C., Aboud, A. and Gyapong, E. (2019), “Female CEOs and Core Earnings 
Quality: New Evidence on the Ethics Versus Risk-Aversion Puzzle”, Journal of Business 
Ethics, Vol. 160 No. 2, pp. 515–534.




































































































































Figure 1 Gould-Fernandez brokerage role (1-mode network) 
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Figure 2 Two-mode variant of GF roles 
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Figure 3 Brokered vs non-brokered chain 
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Figure 4 Number of firms from each sector holding a two-mode GF role 
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Table 1 Firm level descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Return on Capital Employed 
(ROCE)
2,169 15.928 27.715 -114.74 799.75
Board Size 2,169 9.368 2.508 4 20
Assets (log) 2,169 15.432 1.775 10.879 21.606
Number of Employees (log) 2,169 9.006 1.863 1.386 13.382


































































Table 2 Proportion of firms belonging to each sector
Sector Proportion
Mining & Construction 6.64
Manufacturing – Textile, Paper, Wood & 13.28
Manufacturing – Rubber, Metal, Industrial, 
Electronics & Transportation
9.13
Transportation, Communications, Electric, 
Gas & Sanitary Services
10.79
Wholesale & Retail Trade 10.79
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate 33.20
Services – Personal & Supporting Business 11.20
Services – Health, Legal & Social 4.98


































































Table 3 Model estimates (ROCE)
RepGate Itinerant Coordinator Liaison
Number of Employees (log) -0.5831 -0.5698 -0.5915 -0.5405
(0.4463) (0.4459) (0.4467) (0.4419)
Total Assets (Log) -1.8736*** -1.8423*** -1.8452*** -1.9019***
(0.5121) (0.5119) (0.5117) (0.5058)
Board Size 0.0065 0.0274 0.0154 -0.0133
(0.2904) (0.2892) (0.2890) (0.2865)
Sector: Manufacturing – Textile, Paper, 
Wood & Chemical
5.9351 6.1312 5.9899 4.8247
(3.1582) (3.1557) (3.1534) (3.1341)
Sector: Manufacturing – Rubber, 
Metal, Industrial, Electronics & 
Transportation
0.4892 0.7745 0.4399 -0.2524
(3.4093) (3.3916) (3.3898) (3.3563)
Sector: Transportation, 
Communications, Electric, Gas & 
Sanitary Services
2.5915 2.9512 2.6413 2.9823
(3.2668) (3.2586) (3.2512) (3.2197)
Sector: Wholesale & Retail Trade 6.7522* 7.0215* 6.8259* 7.0829*
(3.3432) (3.3474) (3.3421) (3.3085)
Sector: Finance, Insurance & Real 
Estate 
2.9116 2.9616 2.7179 3.5362
(2.8270) (2.8175) (2.8347) (2.7862)
Sector: Services – Personal & 
Supporting Business
10.0990** 10.3501** 10.1663** 10.2913**
(3.2847) (3.2845) (3.2816) (3.2589)
Sector: Services – Health, Legal & 
Social 
-1.7968 -1.6110 -1.7405 -1.0787
(3.9861) (3.9886) (3.9859) (3.9422)
Female-Male Role (lag 1) -0.1885 -5.2031 -0.0020 6.5136***
(1.9614) (5.2846) (1.7761) (1.7024)
Male-Female Role (lag 1) -0.0222 -2.9774 0.5789 10.2540***
(2.3787) (9.7228) (2.8994) (2.0068)
Male-Male Role (lag 1) 0.1266 -2.5189 1.3056 -2.0586**
(0.9185) (2.6232) (1.7218) (0.7954)
Female-Female Role (lag 1) 2.3184 3.8080 2.3322 -10.2182*
(4.8957) (7.9217) (4.8031) (4.0921)
R2 0.0337 0.0346 0.0340 0.0560
Adj. R2 0.0230 0.0240 0.0233 0.0456
Num. obs. 1928 1928 1928 1928
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05


































































Table 4 Model estimates (ROE)
RepGate Itinerant Coordinator Liaison
Number of Employees (log) 1.6658* 1.6675* 1.6428* 1.6728*
(0.7088) (0.7083) (0.7100) (0.7098)
Total Assets (Log) -3.2117*** -3.1506*** -3.1919*** -3.1245***
(0.8133) (0.8130) (0.8132) (0.8124)
Board Size 0.6529 0.6681 0.6695 0.7359
(0.4613) (0.4593) (0.4594) (0.4603)
Sector: Manufacturing – Textile, 
Paper, Wood & Chemical
24.9378*** 25.3509*** 24.9050*** 25.4404***
(5.0160) (5.0122) (5.0115) (5.0342)
Sector: Manufacturing – Rubber, 
Metal, Industrial, Electronics & 
Transportation
8.7472 8.6918 8.4463 9.0859
(5.4149) (5.3868) (5.3872) (5.3912)
Sector: Transportation, 
Communications, Electric, Gas & 
Sanitary Services
18.5488*** 19.4510*** 18.8222*** 19.3797***
(5.1885) (5.1756) (5.1670) (5.1718)
Sector: Wholesale & Retail Trade 16.2487** 16.5417** 16.3552** 16.7613**
(5.3099) (5.3166) (5.3114) (5.3144)
Sector: Finance, Insurance & Real 
Estate 
8.7299 8.6829 8.6646 8.7782*
(4.4899) (4.4750) (4.5050) (4.4754)
Sector: Services – Personal & 
Supporting Business
12.1726* 12.7491* 12.3305* 13.1966*
(5.2169) (5.2168) (5.2153) (5.2347)
Sector: Services – Health, Legal & 
Social 
7.3704 7.8716 7.4223 7.6373
(6.3310) (6.3351) (6.3346) (6.3323)
Female-Male Role (lag 1) 4.4348 -0.1146 -0.6768 -0.5304
(3.1151) (8.3935) (2.8226) (2.7346)
Male-Female Role (lag 1) -0.4948 -1.6826 1.5154 -0.9577
(3.7780) (15.4426) (4.6078) (3.2235)
Male-Male Role (lag 1) -0.9525 -8.3024* 0.9877 -2.0742
(1.4589) (4.1664) (2.7364) (1.2777)
Female-Female Role (lag 1) -1.5981 1.7493 2.9123 -2.1090
(7.7755) (12.5819) (7.6332) (6.5730)
R2 0.0385 0.0394 0.0376 0.0392
Adj. R2 0.0279 0.0288 0.0270 0.0286
Num. obs. 1928 1928 1928 1928
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05
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